FOOD SAFETY POLICY FIGHTS: A U.S. PERSPECTIVE by Caswell, Julie A.
Invited Presentation 
Food Safety Policy Fights: A 
U.S. Perspective 
Julie A. Caswell 
Perspective is very important in understanding the 
area of food safety. This importance is illustrated 
by a favorite cartoon of mine that features an older, 
experienced mouse giving advice to a young mouse. 
The older mouse, in wrapping up, says to the 
younger, "... and stay away from scientists— 
they cause cancer." Facing an avalanche of infor-
mation on links between diet and health, consumers 
may, in frustration, sympathize with the mouse's 
view, and are having some difficulty sorting out 
which are the important cause-and-effect relation-
ships. Government and industry also are struggling 
to develop a coherent approach to food safety and 
nutrition. 
Here, I stretch the term food safety to cover all 
linkages between diet and health, including tradi-
tional safety concerns (e.g., microbial contami-
nation, pesticide residues, additives, naturally 
occurring toxicants, and environmental contami-
nants), as well as the increasingly prominent area 
of links between dietary composition and health 
(e.g., between dietary fiber and cancer). In the 
United States, both types of diet-health linkages 
have been front-page news throughout the late 1980s. A 
short review of some key events will serve to set 
the stage. 
In 1985 the largest recorded outbreak of sal-
monella-related food poisoning in the United States 
occurred in the Chicago area when, it is believed, 
unpasteurized and pasteurized milk were mixed in a 
processing plant owned by the Jewel Companies, a 
supermarket chain. There were over 16,000 con-
firmed cases of salmonellosis as a result and experts 
believe more than ten times that number were ac-
tually affected (Ryan et al.). In 1986 the U.S. General 
Accounting Office (1986a, 1986b) released two 
reports concluding, in effect, that the Food and 
Drug Administration's (PDA) inspection system for 
pesticide residues in domestic and imported food 
was woefully inadequate. 
In 1987 the television show "60 Minutes" aired a 
report, considered infamous in the eyes of in- 
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dustry (which believed it was inflammatory), on 
the presence of salmonella bacteria in chicken 
products. Growth in the demand for chicken products 
slackened after the report (Charlier). First appearing 
in 1984, the number of health claims on food 
products exploded after 1987 as the Reagan 
administration reversed previous policy, which had 
effectively outlawed such claims. The most no-
ticeable result, perhaps, has been the oat-bran craze. 
More importantly, however, large numbers of food 
products now carry health claims, either explicit 
(e.g., diets high in fiber have been shown to reduce 
the risk of colon cancer) or implicit (e.g., no cho-
lesterol). The piece de resistance of the decade's 
growing focus on diet-health linkages came in early 
1989 with the Natural Resources Defense Council's 
well-orchestrated release of its report "Intolerable 
Risk: Pesticides in Our Children's Food.' * Accom-
panied by a "60 Minutes" segment and extensive 
media coverage, the release caused a panic among 
consumers, especially parents, in regard to the 
presence of residues of the growth regulator Alar 
in fresh apples and processed apple products. 
These events are a small sample from a much 
larger set. Understanding of this set of events is 
often overwhelmed by the number of safety and 
nutrition issues involved; the amount of coverage 
the issues have received; the number of players in-
volved, including consumers, firms, state govern-
ments, and federal agencies; and the intricacies of 
federal law. To cut through this confusion, I focus 
here on what I consider to be the bedrock questions 
facing public policies and private (consumer, firm, 
and interest group) strategies in the area of food 
safety and nutrition. To do so, we turn first to an 
overview of the demand for and supply of food 
safety in the U.S. and then focus on the common 
denominators of the related policy choice prob-
lems. These common denominators define the food 
safety policy fights of the 1980s and 1990s. 
The Demand and Supply Picture 
Food safety and nutrition are prominent issues in 
the U.S. today because of the convergence of sev- 60    October 1990 
eral demand and supply factors. First, we know 
much more scientifically about the links between 
diet and health than we did in the past. Second, 
the typical household's expertise in food handling 
and preparation appears to have declined, partic-
ularly with the demise of the full-time homemaker 
who specialized in such knowledge. Third, the 
makeup of the food supply has shifted toward products 
that may pose greater food safety risks: chicken, fish 
and shellfish, imported produce and processed 
products, chilled foods, micro waved products and 
leftovers, and restaurant-prepared meals. And, 
fourth, the U.S. regulatory system probably dete-
riorated absolutely, and certainly relative to the 
task at hand, in the 1980s. 
This latter point is particularly important in un-
derstanding the food safety environment in the U.S. 
today. Media reports indicate that the number of 
resources devoted to food safety fell during the 
1980s (Burros, Time). Nevertheless, from their 
perspective, government and industry officials ar-
gue, with substantial justification, that the U.S. 
food supply is among the safest in the world. Con-
sumers, and those who do advocacy on their behalf 
or in their name, however, may not, from their 
perspective, find such comparisons relevant. They 
compare current safety levels to desired levels and 
find the system inadequate on that basis. Thus, the 
key to the 1980s is not whether the food safety 
system operated well in absolute terms (it actually 
probably deteriorated somewhat), but how it op-
erated relative to desired levels of performance, 
which were increasing. This comparative issue will 
be returned to shortly. 
What does demand for food safety look like? 
What are the desired levels of safety? Much work is 
currently being done developing economic models of 
consumer (or private) demand for food safety and 
nutrition. This work focuses on incorporating food-
related risk considerations into consumer 
decision making (e.g., Zellner; Choi and Jensen; 
Falconi and Roe). Generally, the riskiness (or al-
ternatively, the healthfulness) of a food product 
becomes an argument, either directly or indirectly, 
in the expected utility to be derived from con-
sumption of the product. Attention is then focused 
on how to characterize the risk-based component 
of demand. What is it that consumers worry about 
in regard to food safety and nutrition? How do they 
form, and subsequently update, their beliefs about 
the risk associated with consuming particular prod-
ucts? Given that consumers evaluate food products 
based on multiple attributes (taste, convenience, 
prestige, etc.), to what degree do these risk beliefs 
ultimately affect demand? 
While these models attempt to understand pri- 
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vate demand for food safety and nutrition, food has 
complex characteristics that generate a public de-
mand as well. Food consumption itself is a private 
good in that one person's consumption excludes 
that of another. But there are externalities associ-
ated with food consumption that generate a public 
demand for food safety and nutrition. These 
externalities, associated with acute illnesses (e.g., 
salmonellosis) or chronic disease (e.g., arterio-
sclerosis), include burdens on the health-care system 
and productivity losses to the economy (Roberts; 
Roberts and Pinner). The social demand they gen-
erate underlies government regulation in this area. 
A second foundation of public demand for gov-
ernment regulation is the existence of imperfections 
and failures in markets for information on food 
safety and nutrition attributes. Food is traded in 
markets characterized by imperfect and asymmetric 
information, since many attributes of the product 
are not readily observable before purchase or some-
times even after consumption (Zellner). Improving 
information availability is a major rationale for 
government activity. 
Finally, public demand is generated because it is 
being increasingly recognized by government and 
industry that food safety and nutrition have 
important public good and joint production char-
acteristics. The public good here is a specific type 
of information—confidence in the safety of the 
food supply—the use of which is nonexclusive. 
This confidence is jointly produced by industry and 
government, and there is a temptation for firms to 
free ride by underproducing safety believing that 
any costs in terms of reduced confidence will be 
spread over all firms. Alternatively, in this situa-
tion, firms may try to use brand names in order to 
turn confidence into a private good. Rarely, how-
ever, can a firm insulate itself from the effects of 
other firms' and the government's actions in the 
same market. 
Thus, we have both private and public demand 
for food safety and nutrition, and private and public 
supply. Much confusion arises from the failure to 
distinguish carefully and understand fully the re-
lationships between these different sources of de-
mand and supply. The next section offers a common-
denominators framework for analyzing the key food 
safety and nutrition policy issues. 
The Common Denominators 
of Food Safety Issues 
The demand and supply situation boils down to 
two common questions that apply to all food safety 
and nutrition issues. This first question is, "Who Caswell  Food Safety Policy fights: A U.S. Perspective    61
sets the standards and what form do they take?" 
This is the standard-setting function that reflects 
demand for food safety. The second question is, 
"Who enforces the standards and what form does 
the enforcement take?" This is the enforcement 
function that reflects the supply of food safety. 
Figure 1.    Grid of Potential Decision-Making 
Patterns for Food Safety and Nutrition Issues 
Standard Setting 
In the U.S., there are diverse answers to the 
question of who sets and enforces standards. The 
who may be private parties (consumers, firms, groups 
of consumers or firms), the federal government, or 
state governments. It is useful to look at this ques-
tion in the format of a grid, as shown in Figure 1, 
where all combinations are possible and more than 
one combination can coexist. Examples will help to 
illustrate the cells. An example of private standard 
setting and private standard enforcement is in the 
area of cholesterol intake. Currently there are no 
U.S. government standards regarding the cholesterol 
content of foods.
1 Many individuals, however, have 
chosen to limit their cholesterol intake in light of 
links between cholesterol and heart disease, and 
based on the recommendations of health 
professionals. These people set private standards 
and engage in self-enforcement, passing up super-
premium ice cream and buying fat-free frozen yo-
gurt. 
Regulation of additives in the food supply is an 
example of federal standard setting and enforce-
ment. The PDA reviews all such additives, clas-
sifying them as Generally Recognized as Safe for 
intended uses or as approved food additives. Ad-
ditives that have not been approved for use by the 
PDA are not available to the consumer, regardless 
of whether he or she would, based on his or her 
own private standards, like to use them. 
The final diagonal cell, state standard setting and 
enforcement, is illustrated by California's Propo-
sition 65, the Safe Drinking Water and Toxic En-
forcement Act of 1986 (Phipps, Alien, and Caswell). 
Proposition 65 establishes a duty to warn consumers 
before exposure to substances that pose cancer or 
reproductive risks.
2 Thus, within California this state 
law establishes and enforces information standards. 
In reality, the management of most food safety 
and nutrition problems spans more than one cell, 
with private and government actions being 
intertwined. 
Some background on major categories of food 
safety and nutrition concerns at this point will be 
1 However, standards of identity for food products may indirectly 
dictate the amount of cholesterol in a food product. For example, butterfaf 
standards for ice cream result in cholesterol being present in mosi of 
these products. The labeling of choleslerol content is also regulated. 
Under current implementation regulations, Proposition 65 has not 
been applied to food, but a recenl state court case may soon force such an 
application. 
 
helpful in the further discussion of crosscutting is-
sues that follows. These concerns are commonly 
grouped into six areas. Of these, experts typically 
rank microbial contamination and nutritional im-
balances (e.g., too much fat, too little fiber in the 
diet) at the top of their list of concerns. They are 
followed, some distance back, by naturally occur-
ring toxicants (e.g., aflatoxin) and environmental 
contaminants. Even further back on the list are 
pesticide residues and food additives. The U.S. 
regulatory framework for handling these concerns is 
complex, with the Food and Drug Administration 
(PDA), the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), 
and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
all having jurisdiction in different areas. Of course, 
private parties are also very active in providing 
food safety and in influencing government regu-
lation of these concerns. As private and public parties 
attempt to manage these six areas of concern, they 
repeatedly come up against the same set of 
issues. We turn now to three of these crosscutting 
issues. 
What Standards Should Be Set? Risk Assessment 
and Risk Perception 
For each of the six food safety and nutrition con-
cerns, the bedrock question is, "What standards 
should be set?" This decision is complicated by 
the difference between formal risk assessments and 
the informal risk perceptions held by individuals. In 
the U.S. regulatory system, the developing science 
of quantitative risk assessment is the basis for 
generating the underlying data necessary for making 
standard-setting decisions. These risk assessments 
are probabilities attached to the likelihood of the 
occurrence of illness, injury, or death based on 
epidemiological or experimental data (e.g., Lave, 
National Academy of Sciences). 
   Standard Enforcement   Private   Federal Govt.   State Govt.
Private                        Cholesterol
                                            Intake
     Federal government                         Additives 
    State government                                                  California's
Proposition 65
The key characteristic of these assessments is 
their probabilistic nature. They are probabilistic in at 
least two senses. First, the outcome of the risk-
assessment process is commonly stated in terms of a 
probability; for example, the chance of getting 
cancer over a lifetime from eating food with resi- 62   October 1990 
dues of a particular pesticide is one in one million, or 
10~
6. Second, the data which underlie the risk-
assessment outcome commonly require numerous 
assumptions which have confidence intervals at-
tached to them. With epidemiological data, for ex-
ample, risk assessment might focus on the incidence 
of outbreaks of foodborne illness in the U.S. in a 
particular year. Since not all cases will be reported, 
and indeed many people who suffer such an illness 
will simply think they have the flu, scientists must 
extrapolate from the reported cases to estimate the 
true incidence in the population (Roberts and 
Foegeding). Experimental data require even greater 
extrapolation because they involve making predic-
tions of human health impacts based on feeding 
studies conducted on animal species. Such studies 
are a frequent target for attack by critics and con-
sumers alike since they conjure up visions of rats 
fed the equivalent of hundreds of cans of artificially 
sweetened soda per day. 
Although very lively debate is ongoing over the 
details of risk assessment, there is widespread 
agreement on methodology and little doubt that 
such information is of great use in making regu-
latory decisions. After this point, however, all is 
contention. Even if we all agree on a quantitative 
risk assessment, say that 3 people in 10,000 would 
get cancer after lifetime exposure to a particular 
natural toxicant, we still must decide whether that 
risk is low, medium, or high, and more impor-
tantly, whether it is acceptable or unacceptable. 
Some leverage can be gained on the low/medium/ 
high issue through comparison of risks across products 
and activities. However, such cross comparisons 
offer relatively little leverage in determining whether 
a risk is acceptable. Researchers have found that risk 
has multiple characteristics that influence whether it 
is acceptable, only one of which is represented by 
the information contained in a quantitative risk 
assessment. Also important are characteristics such 
as personal control over exposure, observability, 
newness, and whether the risk is dreaded 
(Fischhoff et al.). Consumers, for example, may 
be willing to accept a higher risk when it is 
associated with a product that they perceive as 
having substantial benefits. This appears to have 
been the case with saccharin, which Congress left 
on the market despite its carcinogenic potential 
because it was the only artificial sweetener 
available at the time. Consumers also may be 
willing to accept higher risks for exposures they 
can control versus those they cannot. 
Experts often express frustration that consumers' 
ranking of the importance of the six food safety 
and nutrition concerns is inverted from that of the 
experts. Part of this gap between consumers' per- 
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ceived risk and the actual scientific risk assessment 
is no doubt due to consumers being relatively ill 
informed about the actual probabilities. If this were 
all there is to it, then an educational program would 
serve to align the risk assessment and perception. 
But the gap is also due to consumers caring about a 
broader range of risk characteristics than is captured 
in the risk assessment. 
In practice, consumer demand is based on per-
ceived risk, not on a quantitative risk assessment. 
Consumers are apparently quite aware that what 
counts is the quality and composition of the overall 
diet. Thus we have the phenomenon, leaving him 
or her open to ridicule by those who value consis-
tency, of a person avoiding beef products because 
of their fat and cholesterol content but indulging 
in super-premium ice cream. Moreover, consumers 
appear willing to make selected "deals with the 
devil,'' thinking that if they reduce risk in one area, 
then maybe they will not suffer any ill conse-
quences from increased risk in another. Here we 
can observe a person who would not eat an apple 
treated with Alar but consumes raw shellfish and 
enjoys dining at his or her favorite sushi bar. Thus, 
the gap between risk perception and risk assess-
ment is due to differences in information on and 
evaluation of risks and, I am convinced, to an ele-
ment of making deals with the devil. 
Both government and private parties must make 
leaps from scientific risk-assessment information 
to risk perception to standard setting, with the stan-
dard setting embodying the decision on what is 
acceptable risk. The fight in the 1980s and 1990s in 
regard to standard setting is focused on defining 
acceptable risk. No one would argue that the federal 
government's current acceptable risk standards are 
consistent. The various pieces of legislation, 
including the Delaney clause, which dictates a zero 
risk standard with regard to cancer, dictate different 
standards, and many substances remain effectively 
grandfathered under less-stringent older standards. In 
the late 1980s, these inconsistencies have been 
particularly evident in the treatment of pesticide 
residues, where the risk standard applied varies 
depending on whether the residue is in a raw product 
or concentrates in the processing of a finished 
product (National Academy of Sciences). This rather 
embarrassing situation has led to recommendations 
aimed at standardization of acceptable-risk bench 
marks across areas. One such attempt is the EPA's 
proposal to institute a negligible-risk standard for 
all its pesticide-residue-related decisions. This 
standard would be set at a one-in-one-million life-
time risk in most cases. Attempts at standardization 
are extremely contentious, however, because they 
may be viewed as attempts to adopt a lowest com-                           Food Seifety Policy fights: A U.S. Perspective    63 











   



















mon denominator, reducing the protection consumers 
receive. 
Government risk standards provide an important 
floor or bench mark in all areas of food safety and 
nutrition. Private parties are then free to institute 
their own higher standards over the products they 
grow, process, and consume. Thus, while the EPA 
sets maximum residue standards for pesticides in 
food, many Americans buy organic foods, which 
have no such residues and thus meet a stricter stan-
dard. Many of the clashes over food safety and 
nutrition issues in the 1980s were caused by shifting 
standards of acceptable risk. In particular, U.S. 
consumers' risk tolerance is decreasing in the area 
of food safety and nutrition. The conflict we see 
is a struggle among consumers, consumer advo-
cates, business, and government for the upper hand 
in defining acceptable risk standards and adjust-
ment by industry and government to these new 
standards. 
How Should Risk Standards Be Implemented? 
Banning Versus Information Strategies 
The second issue which cuts across all areas of 
food safety and nutrition concerns is, "How should 
risk standards be implemented?" The range of gov-
ernment policy choices is large with many nuances 
but can be boiled down to two basic options. Under 
the first option, government standards act as a floor. In 
this case, any product that does not meet the 
standard is declared illegal for sale. In shorthand, 
we can refer to this as the ' 'banning strategy.  The 
second option is for government standards to serve as 
a bench mark, with regulation focused on the 
supply of information to consumers regarding the 
food safety or nutrition attribute in question. In 
shorthand, we can refer to this as the "information 
strategy." Both strategies are widely used by gov-
ernment and have different implications for private 
markets for food safety and nutrition. 
The banning, or floor, strategy is attractive where 
the risks associated with the substance in question 
are high enough that no fully informed consumer 
would buy the product, the attributes involved are 
difficult for consumers to evaluate, or there are 
substantial externality costs associated with its use. 
Through setting and enforcing standards, govern-
ment can assure that a minimum level of safety or 
nutritional quality is delivered to all consumers. 
Examples of this approach can be found in all six 
areas of food safety and nutrition concerns, al-
though the actual means of implementation vary. 
Standards for microbial contamination, for in-
stance, are enforced through an extensive system 
of plant inspection and final product sampling con- 
 ducted by the PDA and the USDA, while standards    
      for additives are enforced through an PDA approval t      
    system. 
        Banning strategies usually limit firm and con-    
   sumer behavior to a greater extent than do infor-  
   mation strategies. The latter strategies involve   
     government regulation of the supply of information       
     to consumers regarding food safety or nutrition at-    
   itributes. For example, the federal government pe- 
riodically publishes nutritional guidelines for the     
   American people. Food sold in the U.S. is not 
    required to conform with these guidelines in any  
  way nor are consumers' diets monitored for com- 
  pliance. To further the acceptance of these stan- 
    dards (as well as for other reasons such as preventing  
    deception), however, the government has extensive 
    labeling regulations that are intended to provide   
    consumers with the information necessary to follow 
     the nutritional guidelines. 
        It is key to understand that in virtually all areas  
    of  food safety and nutrition regulation, mixed ban 
     ning and information strategies are used. For ex 
    ample, the federal government has pesticide-residue  
     standards for food that act as a floor, which if 
    violated make a product illegal for sale. Beyond 
    this, for products that are marketed as containing  
    lower residues (e.g., organic produce), information 
     regulation applies. Any claims made relative to the 
    product cannot be deceptive, and use of terms such 
"organic" are becoming increasingly regulated. 
         The fight in the 1980s and 1990s over how stan 
   dards should be implemented is focused on both  
the mix of banning and information strategies used  
    and the level of enforcement of each. The hallmark  
  of the Reagan administration was deregulation,  
which in practice meant either lessened enforce 
ment of existing laws, a shift from banning strat 
egies toward information strategies, or both. In any  
case, more reliance was placed on private markets  
  to provide food safety, nutrition, and information  
on these attributes to consumers. 
   The regulatory changes of the 1980s created a  
new environment for food growers, processors,  
distributors, and retailers (Caswell and Johnson).  
Increased consumer awareness of and concern about  
diet-health linkages coincided with a relaxed reg 
ulatory environment. Thus, there was increased de 
mand for food safety and nutrition at the same time  
that government supply decreased. In addition, the  
Reagan administration's decision to allow health  
claims on food products made it much easier for  
firms to market the safety and nutrition-related  
characteristics of their products and services. 
   Together these factors have ushered in a new era  
of differentiation of food products and retail ser 
vices based on safety and nutrition. Many firms 64    October 1990 
have jumped at this opportunity for setting and 
enforcing private standards. There is no doubt in 
my mind that many aspects of this increased reli-
ance on markets have been beneficial to consumers 
by increasing the range of products and information 
available. But there is also little doubt in my mind 
that these gains have been jeopardized by the failure 
of the federal government to adequately regulate 
labels and advertisements. 
An increased reliance on market forces, partic-
ularly information, requires that careful attention 
be paid to the rules of the game to ensure that these 
forces generate the desired levels of performance. 
Increasing the scope of differentiation based on 
food safety and nutrition means that, since these 
are attributes desired by the consumer, there will 
be strong temptations for firms to stretch the truth in 
order to claim these characteristics. Thus, in-
creased reliance on information strategies must be 
coupled with strong regulation of label claims and 
advertising to prevent deception. Here, the PDA, 
which regulates label claims, and the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC), which regulates advertising, 
fell down on the job during the 1980s. With a 
strong belief in the capacity of markets to self-
correct and in consumers' ability to wade through 
and discount deceptive claims, the PDA and FTC 
brought few deception cases against major food 
products. Thus we have been experiencing a virtual 
free-for-all, with the Bush administration just be-
ginning to show signs of reining in the situation.
3 
Recent regulatory initiatives by the Bush ad-
ministration indicate that the pendulum is swinging 
back toward increased regulation, or reregulation. 
But where possible, this reregulation is likely to 
be based on the use of information, rather than 
banning strategies. This means that there will con-
tinue to be strong private markets for food safety 
and nutrition, with firms engaging in differentiation to 
serve these markets. For all intents and purposes, the 
genie is out of the bottle and the food industry, from 
farmers to retailers, will have to learn to operate in 
a market where food safety and nutrition are 
important bases of competition. 
It is important to note that not all segments of 
industry have taken to the current era of deregu-
lation and differentiation with equal enthusiasm. 
Some of industry is still reeling from these devel-
opments. Many believe that society benefited from 
the presumption that all food available on the mar- 
Several states have been active, in the breach, in pursuing deceptive 
advertising cases against food products. They have won agreements to 
revise or withdraw advertisements from Campbell Soup, Kellogg, and 
Nabisco. 
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ket is safe and that differentiation based on safety 
creates higher costs with no real benefit in terms 
of improved health status for consumers. Others 
simply do not want to compete on the basis of food 
safety and nutrition. They may feel that setting and 
enforcing risk standards is beyond the scope of their 
expertise and should be handled by government, 
or they may be comfortable with the current bases 
of rivalry in their industry and not wish to have 
their boats rocked. It behooves firms and industry 
associations that oppose these developments to 
scrutinize the basis of their objections. Their ar-
guments will be on much more solid footing if they 
can argue that their opposition is based on a belief 
that more reliance on government regulation is de-
sirable rather than on simply protecting their turf. 
Who Should Set and Implement the Standards? 
The final crosscutting issue is, "Who should be 
responsible for setting and implementing safety and 
nutrition standards?" This issue is, of course, closely 
linked to the previous two because standard setting 
and enforcement are so closely tied to the party 
who carries them out. As noted earlier, the major 
candidates are the federal government, state gov-
ernments, or private parties (firms, consumers, and 
their associations). 
A major source of conflict is the division of 
responsibility for food safety and nutrition regu-
lation between the federal and state governments. 
As the federal regulatory system stumbled in the 
1980s, the states were quick to step into the breach, 
becoming active in a number of areas where federal 
law does not expressly preempt their activity. Ex-
amples of areas regulated include warning labels 
(e.g., California's Proposition 65), deceptive 
advertising, sale of irradiated food, and point-of-
purchase information on pesticides used on fresh 
fruits and vegetables. States have traditionally en-
joyed a fair degree of latitude in establishing such 
regulations (Caswell). 
Industry has not been pleased with the fruit of 
this new federalism. Firms and trade associations 
argue that costs associated with the resulting frag-
mentation of the national market far outweigh any 
benefits to consumers from such state regulation. 
As changes in federal regulatory programs are con-
sidered, industry groups are pushing hard to get 
explicit preemption of state regulation written into 
legislation and federal agency regulations. They 
appear willing to trade somewhat stricter federal 
regulation for federal preemption. However, this 
trade fails to satisfy state governments, consumer 
advocates, and environmental activists. An attempt      Food Safety Policy Fights: A U.S. Perspective    65  Caswell 
in 1986 at sweeping reform of the federal pesticide 
law failed, in part, because of disagreement on this 
point. 
The second key conflict in this area is over the 
degree to which private parties should be relied on 
to set and implement food safety and nutrition stan-
dards. In other words, how well do private markets 
for these attributes work? Because of the exter-
nality and public-good characteristics of food prod-
ucts, many individuals, including some in industry, 
are skeptical about further increased reliance on 
private markets. 
The^/ir in the 1980s and 1990s over who should 
set and implement standards has thus largely fo-
cused on attempts to suppress the states' increasing 
involvement in regulation of food safety and nu-
trition. I believe this is, in large part, a losing cause 
because the states want to retain the right to provide 
consumer protection and do not trust the federal 
government to do an adequate job. They have allies 
in Congress who will support their cause. Firms 
are likely to be dealing with more fragmented mar-
kets as a result of successful state regulatory ef-
forts. 
A. Fight Summary: The Case of Health Claims 
The fights over food safety and nutrition policy in 
the 1980s, and as they carry over with full force 
into the 1990s, are here highlighted by a briefcase 
study of health-claims regulation. In defining ac-
ceptable risk, government agencies and private parties 
worked hard during the 1980s to develop a 
consensus on accepted relationships between die-
tary composition and health. This led to the de-
velopment of a series of dietary recommendations 
that appeared throughout the decade. 
Regulation of health claims for food products 
reflected the general shift away from banning to-
ward information strategies. President Reagan's 
decision to allow such claims reversed the prior 
regulatory strategy that had banned them. In the 
case of health claims, this shift was not accom-
panied by increased federal efforts to regulate de-
ception, resulting in a virtual free-for-all situation 
in which several states attempted to step in. The 
states' efforts to regulate claims have led to at-
tempts to suppress state involvement. It is not clear at 
this writing whether new health-claims policies 
being written in Congress and the PDA will include 
preemption language. 
Finally, ambivalence about increased reliance on 
private markets is evident in the area of health 
claims. Secretary of Health and Human Services 
Louis Sullivan, for example, said in early 1990 
    that he believed that regulation of health claims in  
the late 1980s had been too lenient. Reregulation is 
almost a certainty, but we are not likely to return to a 
ban on health claims. Much more likely is a 
continued reliance on information-based regulatory 
strategies, albeit coupled with closer regulation of 
the content of information provided to consumers 
through labels and advertising. 
Conclusions/Predictions 
Food safety and nutrition are pivotal issues in the 
food system today because debate over them artic-
ulates values associated with the environment, pro-
duction agriculture, government restrictions on 
private business operations, the role of government 
as protector, and consumer choice. What will the 
food safety and nutrition picture look like in the 
future? My predictions are as follows. U.S. con-
sumers' tolerance for risk associated with food safety 
and nutrition will continue to decrease (in other 
words, their standard for acceptable risk will be-
come stricter). This will be reflected in a retreat 
from the lax regulatory environment of the 1980s. 
But, where possible, government will use infor-
mation strategies that give more choice to consumers 
in preference to banning strategies. This will put a 
premium on effective regulation of label claims and 
advertising in order to prevent deception. 
Even as regulation tightens, we will not be re-
turning to the pre-1980s regulatory environment. 
There will continue to be strong private markets 
for food safety and nutrition, with firms engaging 
in differentiation to serve these markets. Firms and 
industries that wish this were not true must rec-
ognize that the genie is out of the bottle and must 
learn to compete on these bases. Those firms and 
industries clamoring for uniform national standards 
may be disappointed as attempts to trade national 
food law reform for federal preemption are largely 
unsuccessful. Firms are likely to be dealing with a 
more fragmented market due to state regulation 
and, perhaps more importantly, due to market seg-
mentation based on consumers' responsiveness to 
the marketing of safety and nutrition attributes. 
This, from my perspective, is the outline of the 
food safety and nutrition environment in the 1990s. 
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